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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY : 
KAY, ROBERT L. KAY, 
and TERESA KAY, : 
Plaintiffs- : Case No. 870121 
Appellants, 
vs. 
: Category 14b 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., 
a corporation, VAL E. : 
SOUTHWICK; et al. , 
Defendants-
Respondents. : 
\FIPH | AN |«s UH'I \ BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Contrary to the statement on page 1 of respondents' brief, 
appellants (Kays) appealed from all portions of the Ruling 
granting Defendants1 Motion fur Summary Judgment A\W.I dismissing 
Kays1 complaint Although certain portions of that ruling were 
not addressed in appellants' nitial brief, the correctness of 
those portions turns on t t" s ruling on the portions which 
were specifically addressed. Appellants are entitled to a 
reversal for trial on the merits on all issues. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellants object to respondents' (defendants1) assertion, 
set forth in paragraph I of respondent's statement of Issues 
Presented, that appellants have "misinterpreted" testimony not 
previously presented to the trial court. Respondents do not 
identify any specific testimony which they claim was misinter-
preted. Appellants readily acknowledge that their interpreta-
tion of the testimony may be different from that of respondents. 
On a motion for summary judgment, however, it is very proper for 
appellants to draw all inferences from the testimony in the 
light most favorable to their position. Bowen v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants object to the statements set forth in the first 
two paragraphs of the "Statement of the Case" section of 
respondents1 brief, to the effect that appellants1 problems are 
due solely to an economic decline in Vernal, Utah. Respondents 
cite to no evidence in support of their assertions, and none was 
presented to the trial court. More importantly, the evidence 
does establish that in spite of any economic decline which may 
have existed, the Kays obtained a valid offer for the purchase 
of the entire subdivision. (R. 504, 529.) The only factor 
which prevented Kays from accepting that offer was not the 
economy but rather respondents1 failure to arrange for the 
reconveyance of lots in accordance with their contractual 
obligations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kays object to the assertion, in the first paragraph of 
the Statement of Facts section of respondents1 brief (page 6), 
to the effect that only the facts set forth by defendants were 
"established" before the lower court. Facts are not 
2 
"established" on a motion for summary judgment in the tradi-
tional sense of: the word, Holbrook Co, v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1975)• Both in the trial court and in .this court, the 
statements in the record are i eweel ;i n the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion. Brigcrs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
2 8 1 , 283 (Utah App. 19 8 7 ) . Those statements, together with all 
reasoixafal e I nferences from those statements, constitute the 
"facts" which are "established" for purposes of summary judg-
ment . 
Contrary I. these well PS< abwished principles, defendants 
have cited to this cour* facts and * tie inferences 
therefrom which are f a v o p n ~ ^^ ^ it * :*:**? laim 
that the record is devoid of any other facts or inferences As 
shown below and in the Argument which follows, several "facts" 
cited by defendants die inaccurate ur were disputed. In 
addition, defendants omit several facts which were established 
by the record. Finally, defendants draw inferences from 
fact s o n .1 y i n t: h e I r I a v o r 
Defendants correctly assert in paragraph 2 of their 
Statement of Facts that' Kays had applied for loins ft" DIT« three 
banks prior; to seeking financing from Summit Systems, Inc. 
("Summit"). The record cited to the tria 1 court by Summit, 
however, further suppo r t s i h e i n f erence tl: la t t n e decision of 
these banks to not extend financing was not related to any risks 
inherent in the transaction, and that some of the bank officers 
made affirmative statements n i tu the '/lability of the project. 
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The banks simply did not want to commit that amount of money to 
the Vernal area. (R. 431-32.) 
In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts section of their 
brief, defendants assert that Summit paid certain closing and 
other costs beyond what would be expected for a "typical" loan 
transaction. Although defendants made this assertion before the 
trial court, Kays specifically disputed the assertion, and 
pointed out that the $139,000.00 discount was more than adequate 
to cover the costs of these expenses paid by Summit. (R. 510.) 
Defendants failed to include in their Statement of Facts, 
and incorrectly assert that the record did not establish, the 
fact as set forth in Kays' initial brief that Kays had been 
advised and had understood up until the time of closing that the 
discount would be approximately 10% and the interest rate would 
be 10%. (R. 499, 524.) They did not learn until closing that 
the discount would be approximately 17% and the interest rate 
would be 17%. (R. 500, 525.) Although Kays objected to the 
discount rate and interest rate, they had no reasonable alter-
native at that time but to sign the loan documents. (Deposition 
of Lawrence Kay, June 12, 1986, at pages 93-94.) 
The record also "establishes" that at closing Val 
Southwick, president of Summit, advised and assured plaintiffs 
that the appropriate number of lots would be reconveyed upon the 
calling of the letters of credit, the same as with other 
payments of principal. (R. 500-01, 525-26.) 
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In paragraph 12 of their Statement of Facts, defendants 
refer to :t second written request :;or; release of lots. Defen-
dants' Statement of Facts fails tr acknowledge, and incorrectly 
asserts that the record did not s^r^b,ish
 ; that pla i ntiffs made 
a written request for the release of 12 Lots on January 10, 
1985, '- 503-04, 528-29.) In addition, plaintiffs made an 
additional pr^:. ~ - - - •- - -;-isf ' *ne lots about May 
1, 1985, in response -• */:,.-; Summit promised to reconvey the 
lots. The June 2, 1985, letter was merely * memorialization of 
those prior d I scussions and agr eemei its H -•.- * «. -
Although the issue is not material, the record indicates 
that the Complaint in this matter was filed on February 12, 
1986, not on March ?'?, 1 986, as asserted by defendants in 
paragraph 19 of their Statement of Facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs can not on appeal rely 
on evidence which was in the record but not brought * uAe 
a t t e n t i o n «,»f" flip tri.il imdqe, T h i s i our t ~: • •-,. . -bat 
issue because the evidence which was called - le trial 
court's attention establishes the existence ui material issues 
ot fact precluding summary judgmen- "f the Cnnrf d^es reach 
that issue, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules : :ivii Procedure 
clearly provides that summary judgment is prec:udp. i f any 
disputed issues of material facts appear in the depositionr
 y 
affidavits, and other materials on file. Although plaintiffs of 
course can not introduce new evidence mi appeal, they iiidy rely 
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on any statements in any of the depositions, affidavits, or 
other materials which were on file with the trial court, even if 
the existence of those statements was not specifically called to 
the trial court's attention. 
Summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction issue was 
improper in any event because there exist disputed issues of 
material facts, even if the inquiry is limited solely to those 
portions of the record called to the attention of the trial 
court. 
The contract between the parties required defendants to 
reconvey an appropriate number of lots upon receiving any 
payment of principal, including payments resulting from the 
calling of letters of credit. Such a construction is not 
unreasonable as contended by defendants, and defendants1 
proposed construction of the contract would be equally un-
reasonable. To the extent the contract was ambiguous, there 
existed a genuine issue of material fact as to what the parties 
intended by the contract. 
The assertion that plaintiffs accepted the benefits of the 
contract and thereby waived any claim to seek reformation of the 
contract is raised for the first time on appeal, and should not 
be considered by this court. Similarly raised for the first 
time on appeal is the assertion that plaintiffs1 claims for 
reformation are barred by Summit's assignment of the ben^icial 
interest under the trust deed to various allegedly bona fide 
purchasers. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED IF ISSUES OF FACT 
APPEAR IN ANY MATERIALS ON FILE, NOT JUST IN THE 
MATERIALS CIl^D TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendants assert on page 13 of their brief that "[i]n their 
appellate brief, the Kays rely heavily upon deposition testimony 
of the Kays and others which was never presented to the lower 
court." Defendants assert that this is improper.1 This Court 
need not reach this issue. Kays acknowledge that they have 
cited to this Court certain deposition testimony which was not 
specifically called to the attention of the trial court prior to 
the ruling on the motion for summary judgment. This "extra" 
deposition testimony, however, merely highlights the existence 
of disputed issues of fact. Those disputed factual issues are 
also apparent from the affidavits and depositions which were 
cited to the trial court prior to its ruling. See Point III 
below. 
Appellants may, nevertheless, rely on appeal on statements 
in the record which were not specifically called to the atten-
tion of the trial court. The test of whether summary judgment 
is appropriate is whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
defendants advisedly do not challenge the fact that the 
^^atements in the depositions clearly raise factual disputes. 
Defendants apparently concede that the summary judgment must be 
reversed if the deposition testimony is considered, and seek to 
avoid that result solely by objecting to the consideration of 
that testimony. 
7 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (~) (emphasis 
added). This Court should apply the same standard on review. 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). See also 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). 
The critical inquiry, therefore, both at the trial level 
and before this court, is whether the depositions and other 
materials on file evidence disputed issues of material facts. 
See Conder v. A. L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 
641 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring). If the depositions 
on file establish the existence of a disputed issue of material 
fact, a grant of summary judgment must be reversed, even if that 
portion of the deposition was not specifically called to the 
attention of the trial court. 
In so asserting, appellants acknowledge that it would have 
been preferable to have called the trial court's attention to 
the portions of the deposition which establish the existence of 
disputed factual issues.2 Appellants1 failure does not, 
2
 Appellants, through their present counsel, did call the 
portions of the deposition testimony to the attention of the 
trial court after the grant of summary judgment, and requested 
the court to vacate the judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ P. 
60(b). (R. 977-79.) Because Judge Davidson, who granted the 
summary judgment, had bee^ appointed to the Court of Appeals, 
plaintiff's motion for an order vacating the grant of summary 
judgment was heard by Judge Boyd Bunnell. Judge Bunnell denied 
the motion on the grounds that it was in the nature of an 
appeal. (R. 1097-1100.) But see 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 184 
(1971) (successor judge has full authority to hear and determine 
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however, abrogate the clear directive of Rule 56(c) that the 
propriety of summary judgment is governed by all material on 
file. Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Corp,, 
722 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1983). The principle was explained 
by one federal court as follows: 
It is bootless to contend, as defendants 
did on oral argument, that, although the 
deposition was filed in the record, it 
could properly be ignored by the judge 
in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment because plaintiff's counsel did 
not in some manner bring it directly to 
the judge's attention. Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(c) provides in part: 
The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, 
together with the af-
fidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and 
that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
The rule does not distinguish between 
depositions merely filed and those 
singled out by counsel for special 
attention. 
Higgenbotham v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 607 F. 2d 653, 656 
(5th Cir. 1979) . 
Furthermore, regardless of whether it was called to the 
attention of the trial court, the deposition testimony which 
undisputedly establishes the existence of a material factual 
issue has now been cited both to the trial court and to this 
motion for a new trial). 
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court* It would exalt form over substance, and unfairly 
penalize the Kays for the conduct of their counsel, to ignore 
those facts: 
Having read [the record], we cannot 
ignore what we have found. "Appellate 
courts should not look the other way to 
ignore the existence of genuine issues 
of material facts . . . .,f 
Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Construction Co., 
Inc., 695 F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir 1983), quoting Mintz v. Mathers 
Fund, Inc., 463 I.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir 1972). 
Defendants rely primarily on two Utah cases in support of 
their assertion that appellants may not now rely on deposition 
testimony not cited to the trial court. Cowan & Co. v. Atlas 
Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45 
(Utah 1983). Neither of these cases addresses the issue 
presented in the instant case. The issue in each case was 
whether the appellant could rely on appeal on evidence which was 
not part of the record before the trial court. In the instant 
case, the deposition testimony upon which appellants rely was 
clearly part of the record. 
In summary, Rule 56(c) clearly prohibits summary judgment 
if evidence of a disputed issue of fact exists in the deposi-
tions and other materials on file. The deposition testimony 
relied upon by appellants in their initial brief was all lfon 
file" with the district court prior to the grant of summary 
judgment. Defendants advisedly do not dispute that those 
10 
depositions establish the existence of a disputed material 
factual issue relating to the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction. Summary judgment was improper, and this case 
should be remanded for a trial on the merits. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO 
TIMELY RECONVEY LOTS. 
Point I of appellants1 initial brief3 established that 
defendants had breached the trust deed and trust deed note by 
failing to reconvey twelve lots pursuant to a written demand 
made on January 10, 1985. Kays were entitled to the recon-
veyance of those lots by reason of principal payments resulting 
from the calling of letters of credit. Defendants respond to 
this argument by asserting that requiring defendants to reconvey 
the lots would have resulted in an impairment of their security, 
and argue that such a construction is contrary to what defen-
dants view as the intent and purpose of the trust deed. 
Defendants then set forth a hypothetical example on pages 25 and 
26 of their brief which they claim illustrates their point. 
Defendants' argument might have some merit if Kays had 
agreed, as incorrectly asserted by defendants on page 22 of 
their brief, to "fully collateralize" the loan, and if the sole 
purpose of the trust deed was to protect the defendants. Kays 
made no such agreement, however, and the trust deed also 
3
 Defendants incorrectly refer to this issue in their brief 
as the Kays1 "second" major contention, and refer to the fourth 
and final point in Kays1 initial brief as Kays1 primary argument. 
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contained provisions for the benefit of Kays. Just as the 
construction of the trust deed urged by Kays might seem to 
conflict with the purpose perceived by defendants of providing 
security for the loan, so the construction advocated by defen-
dants conflicts with the purpose of allowing reconveyances of 
lots which could then be sold to generate the money necessary to 
make further payments. The hypothetical example4 postulated by 
defendants illustrates this point: 
Borrower desires to develop 50 
lots into an improved subdivision, and 
borrows $100,000.00 to do so. Security 
for the loan is 50 lots valued at 
$1,000.00 each, and two letters of 
credit, one for $30,000.00 and one for 
$20,000.00. Lender agrees to release 
one lot for each $2,000.00 principal 
received. 
Borrower fails to make the first 
payment due on the loan, so the lender 
draws on the $30,000.00 letter of 
credit, but does not reconvey any lots. 
Because borrower has no lots which can 
be resold, he is not able to make the 
next payment and the lender draws on the 
$20,000.00 letter of credit, again 
refusing to reconvey any lots. 
4The hypothetical postulated by defendants does not, of 
course, conform to the facts in this case. First, the letters 
of credit in fact comprised only 35% of the total security even 
using defendants' assumptions as to the value of that security. 
(The evidence would also support a finding that the letters of 
credit were a much smaller proportion of the entire security, 
i.e., that the real estate was worth much more than $526,000.00. 
(Deposition of Lawrence Kay, June 12, 1986, at Exhibit 9.)) 
More importantly, the trust deed provided that on: lot 
would be reconveyed for each $15,000.00 principal paid. There 
is no evidence which would justify this Court in assuming that 
the lots were valued at less than $15,000.00 each, and certainly 
no basis to assume they were only worth $7,500.00 each as 
implicitly assumed by the hypothetical. 
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Lender is now owed $50,000.00, 
secured by $50,000.00 in lots, and 
perceives the transaction as being fair. 
The borrower, however, has "paid" 
$50,000.00 b ~ has no lots to market. 
If the borrower is somehow able to 
pay the remaining $50,000.00, borrower 
would be entitled to a reconveyance of 
25 lots. Just before the final payment 
is made, the lender will be owed only 
$2,000.00, but will hold 26 lots, valued 
at $26,000.00, as security. 
This hypothetical, viewed from the perspective of the 
borrower, demonstrates the commercial impracticability of the 
construction of the contract urged by defendants. It does not 
make commercial sense from the borrower's viewpoint to be unable 
to obtain reconveyances of lots where the borrower has already 
paid several times the value of those lots. 
Although each construction of the trust deed is reasonable 
when viewed from the perspective of the party advocating that 
construction, neither construction is wholly satisfactory. 
Under such circumstances, two rules of law dictate the result. 
First, the contract is to be construed against the drafter, 
Summit Systems, Inc., and in particular, release provisions in a 
trust deed "should be interpreted more strongly against the 
party required to give the release . . . .M Sears v. Riemersma. 
655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). Second, to 
the extent that the contract is ambiguous, summary judgment was 
improper because there existed issues of fact as to what the 
parties intended by the agreement. Both Robert and Lawrence Kay 
testified by affidavit as follows: 
13 
On the occasion of the First 
Meeting and on the occasion of the Loan 
Closing, Southwick advised plaintiffs 
that in the event that it became 
necessary for Summit to resort to the 
letters of credit which were given by 
plaintiffs to Summit as additional 
security for the Subject Loan, any 
portion of the proceeds therefrom which 
was applied toward the reduction of the 
principal amount of the Subject Loan 
would entitle plaintiffs to a release of 
lots as otherwise provided in the 
documents evidencing the subject loan. 
R. 500-01, 525-26. 
Where a contract is ambiguous, the construction of the 
contract is a question of fact. Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. 
Weihina, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1987) . Summary 
judgment on this issue was improper. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
NEGATED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Defendants assert in their brief that Kays may not on 
appeal rely on any statements in the record which were not 
specifically called to the attention of the trial court. Point 
I of this Reply Brief establishes that this contention is 
contrary to the clear language of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
court does not need to reach that issue, however, because the 
evidence which was called to the attention of the trial court 
negates the existence of an accord and satisfaction. As set 
forth more fully on pages ?~ and 18 of Kays1 initial brief, 
Lawrence Kay and Robert Kay each testified with respect to the 
release of lots as follows: 
14 
Southwick denied Summit had any obliga-
tion to provide plaintiffs with releases 
of lots until approximately May 1, 1985, 
but he thereafter repeatedly ack-
nowledged Summit's obligation to provide 
plaintiffs with such releases and 
repeatedly promised Affiant that Summit 
would promptly provide such releases. 
Affidavit of Lawrence C. Kay, paragraph 17 (R. 503-04); Af-
fidavit of Robert L. Kay, paragraph 17 (R. 528-29). 
A reasonable inference from these statements is that 
Summit determined to reconvey the seven lots not to compromise 
and settle a greater claim, but because Summ:.t had finally 
acknowledged that Kays were entitled to the release of those 
lots and had agreed to perform its legal obligation. 
In contrast to this evidence, defendants presented no 
evidence in support of their claim of accord and satisfaction, 
and certainly did not present any evidence clearly demonstrating 
that there was a definite meeting of the minds and that the 
parties understood that Kays, by accepting the seven lots, were 
waiving their claim to the greater number of lots. See Security 
State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1987); Tates 
Inc. v. Little America Refining Co. , 535 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah 
1975). 
Even based upon the evidence which was specifically called 
to the attention of the trial court, therefore, when properly 
viewed in the light most favorable to Kays, summary judgment on 
the issue of accord and satisfaction was improper. 
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POINT IV 
THE CLAIM THAT KAYS ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS OF 
LOAN AND RATIFIED IT AND ACCORDINGLY CAN NOT 
REFORM THE CONTRACT WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. 
Point IV.C. of respondents1 brief asserts that Kays 
accepted the benefits of the loan and ratified it and accord-
ingly are barred from seeking reformation of the contract. This 
claim is raised for the first time on appeal, and should not be 
considered by this court. James v. Preston. 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 
49, 50 (Ct. App. 1937). 
POINT V 
THE CLAIM THAT THE TRUST DEED AND THE NOTE CAN NOT 
BE REFORMED BECAUSE THEY ARE HELD BY BONA FIDE 
PURCHASERS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Point IV.D. of respondent's brief asserts that the trust 
deed and note were assigned to bona fide purchasers, and that 
the assignment bars reformation. No evidence was presented to 
the trial court as to whether the assignees of the trust deed 
and note took their assignments in good faith and without notice 
of any potential claims relating to the note. In addition, the 
claim is raised for the first time on appeal. Although there is 
an oblique reference to the issue in Defendants' Reply Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 559), it does 
not appear that the issue was actually considered by the trial 
court and it can not be considered to have been raised before 
that court. Defendants are therefore barred from raising that 
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issue on appeal. James v. Preston, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence called to the attention of the trial court, 
viewed as required in the light most favorable to Kays, raises a 
disputed factual issue as to whether Kays understood that by 
accepting the reconveyance of seven lots they were thereby 
waiving their claim for a reconveyance of a greater number of 
lots. Summary judgment on that issue was therefore improper, 
even based on the limited evidence specifically called to the 
attention of the trial court. 
Kays in addition called to the attention of the trial 
court in a post judgment motion, and have demonstrated to this 
court on appeal, that statements in depositions which were on 
file with the district court undisputedly raise an issue of fact 
with respect to the claim of accord and satisfaction. Respon-
dents apparently concede that the statements in the deposition 
raise an issue of fact, but seek to have this court ignore those 
statements because they were not specifically called to the 
attention of the trial court. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, however, clearly provides that summary judgment 
is precluded if a dispute of fact appears in the depositions on 
file. Furthermore, this Court, having been now apprised of the 
existence of the issue of fact, should not ignore what now 
clearly appears. 
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Summit breached the terms of the trust deed and note by 
failing to reconvey lots to which Kays were entitled. Two 
constructions of the trust deed are possible, and each construc-
tion is reasonable when viewed from the perspective of the party 
advocating that construction. The trust deed must accordingly 
be construed against Summit, who drafted it, or in the alterna-
tive, this court should hold that the contract is ambiguous and 
remand for the taking of evidence as to the intention of the 
parties. 
The judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' 
Complaint on Summary Judgment should be reversed, and this case 
remanded for trial on the merits on all issues. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 1988. 
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